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The Antitrust Exemption for Joint Employee Activity
Laurence Gold*
The issues concerning the tensions between the labor laws and
the antitrust laws are most easily understood when you look first
at the law with respect to unions acting alone, because that law
rests on one rule. Almost without exception, aside from this one
area, everything else about labor-antitrust law is a posit. On all
other questions each of us waits with a good deal of unease if we
are actively involved, or with bemused interest if we are not, for
the next Supreme Court decision; such decisions being roughly as
predictable as other random occurrences.
The "rule" is the one Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
Court, declared in United States v. Hutcheson,' "So long as a
union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and illicit under [section 20 of the Clayton Act]
are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom
or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness, of the end of which the particular union activities are the
means." 2 By and large what those words have been understood to
say ever since is that unions, acting as unions, are simply not subject to the antitrust laws. One would have expected, given how ideological this area has been, that the Hutcheson rule would have
been conceded to be clearly correct in light of the central point of
the Clayton Act's declaration that the labor of the human being is
not a commodity. To be sure, as the courts have recognized, what
working people do in the labor market affects other markets, but
Congress' policy is to treat labor markets and the consequences of
labor market combinations differently from product markets and
product market combinations. And, if one needs a utilitarian justification for that policy, one does exist: the refusal to talk about the
opportunity price of human labor when the labor market is the last
resort and society's disdain for suicide as a way of dealing with
General Counsel, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.
1. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
2. Id. at 232 (footnote omitted).
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economic adversity are not all that difficult to grasp.
What has the Hutcheson rule been held to mean in more particular terms? So long as the union does not "combine with non-labor
groups," there is an exemption. Starting with United Mine Workers v. Pennington8 and Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea,' which in my judgment presage the developments in
this area of the law and are responsible for those developments far
more than the Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,5 decision (which simply draws out the lessons of
Jewel Tea), the critical issues have been: how to treat combinations between labor and non-labor groups; how to define such combinations; and whether to distinguish such combinations from
agreements between labor and non-labor groups. Distinguishing
combinations from agreements is important, particularly in a
straightforward collective bargaining agreement between one employer and a union, or between a multi-employer group and a
union, or a series of agreements between an employer and a union
which could be brought within the doctrine of conscious parallelism (as that doctrine may stand after next Term's decisions). The
remaining speakers are going to address themselves to the complex
questions presented once the existence of a labor-nonlabor group
combination, as the law presently regards that term, is established.
The only other matter that is properly in my bailiwick is the
question, "what is a non-labor group?" Again it is my judgment
that the law is quite well developed and has been relatively stable
for the last ten or fifteen years. The most recent Supreme Court
case is H.A. Artists & Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Association.' Building on earlier cases, the Court restates the test for determining the existence of a non-labor group. In determining
whether Hutcheson applies, i.e., whether there is a combination
between a labor and non-labor group rather than between labor
groups, one looks to whether the party seeking Hutcheson protection is a bona fide labor organization and whether that party's activities are addressed to job or wage competition or to some other
economic interrelationship affecting legitimate labor market interests of employee union members and the alleged labor group. The
normal situation in which a concentration of labor groups is found
is the situation of people who are not employees but who are in
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direct wage and job competition with employee union members, as
in the situation of independent contractor truckers. Orchestra
leaders who work at the trade, those who actively lead an orchestra
or play an instrument, are the second leading factor in the "labor
group" community, and theatrical agents come third. Who else is
in the "labor group" category, I cannot tell you, either on the basis
of pure reason or the decided cases. The Court makes it quite plain
in H.A. Artists that employers of union members almost always
are members of a non-labor group. The opinion also indicates that
"labor groups" likely have to occupy a critical role in the relevant
labor market, which is a different way of stating the "job and wage
competition or other economic interrelationship" standard that the
Supreme Court has consistently applied.
In terms of pure logic, it would appear both under Hutcheson
and under H.A. Artists that all agreements between a union and a
labor group fall within the exemption and are not governed by the
antitrust laws. H.A. Artists indicates that here, as in other places,
pure logic does not govern. The agreement, to be exempt, must be
addressed to a legitimate concern of the union as the Supreme
Court or some other lower tribunal defines legitimate concern.
Thus, with regard to a franchise fee charged by the union to administer the regulatory program governing agents in H.A. Artists,
the Court ruled that the Hutcheson exemption did not apply and
the case is back in the district court for a pure antitrust determination as opposed to a labor exemption determination of the legality of charging such a fee. The matter has been briefed and argued,
but as yet, has not been decided by the district judge.

